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Abstract
We investigate the time-varying relationship of funding liquidity (FL) and mar-
ket liquidity (ML) in a Markov regime-switching model. By using a comprehen-
sive U.S. TRACE dataset, we provide strong evidence that FL and corporate
bond ML are interlinked, and their impact on each other is highly regime-
dependent. We find that FL and ML exhibit a large-and-positive mutual impact
when money market is tight and equity market is volatile. But in normal
regimes, FL is found to have a negative impact on ML with a much smaller
magnitude than those in stressed regimes. Furthermore, FL is more stable than
ML with less regime changes. Our article offers insight on the important mecha-
nism by which central banks can improve ML through the funding market.
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1 | INTRODUCTION
Financial time series occasionally display dramatic
breaks in their behaviour, due to, for example, financial
crises. Therefore, the idea of the financial market finding
itself in different states at different times becomes appeal-
ing. Focusing on the recent academic and policy inter-
ests, our study elaborates the time-varying relationship of
funding liquidity and market liquidity across stressed and
normal regimes in the U.S. corporate bond market,
where the switch between the two regimes is governed by
the outcome of a Markov process. Our finding therefore
builds a channel that central banks can use to improve
market liquidity through funding markets.
It is common that firms finance their securities trad-
ing through borrowing on either an unsecured or a
secured basis. The ease with which they can obtain
funding affects their willingness and ability to provide
market liquidity (i.e., the ease with which securities are
traded). In recent decades, several financial crises have
been triggered by liquidity shocks. For example, the 2008
financial crisis illustrates that a sharp de-leveraging of
dealers' repo books coincided with an increase in Trea-
sury bonds' bid-ask spreads (see Dudley, 2016). The
Russian default and the LTCM collapse in 1998 is
another example of fragility of liquidity where a relatively
small liquidity shock had an unexpectedly large impact.
The co-movement of market liquidity (ML) and
funding liquidity (FL) has received growing attention of
market participants, central bankers and academics in
recent years (see, e.g., Brunnermeier & Pedersen, 2009;
Dudley, 2016). One of the main reasons is the desire to
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learn lessons from the financial crises of the recent
decades, including the crises following the collapse of
LTCM in 1998 and Lehman Brothers in 2008. It is
observed that sudden drying-up of funding liquidity, trig-
gered by demise of several major financial institutions'
ability to finance their long-dated illiquid assets, led to
much reduced overall market liquidity and a high degree
of systemic stress.
A second reason is that central banks, acting as the
lender-of-last-resort, desire to gain a better understanding
of the dynamics of both funding liquidity and market
liquidity, and a better awareness of how central banks
can provide a funding liquidity ‘backstop’ in order to
improve market liquidity when markets are experiencing
negative shocks. Finally, with the expectation of the end
of a near zero-interest-rate monetary policy in the United
States and other advanced economies, rising interest rates
will generate selling pressure and cause bond prices to
fall. In this case, maintaining a liquid market is pivotal to
financial market stability.
In this study, we take a different step to investigate
the relationship of funding liquidity and market liquidity.
We use a Markov regime-switching model in the analysis.
In this model, the interaction of funding liquidity and
market liquidity is assumed to follow a non-linear sta-
tionary process. By Markov properties, the current value
of the variable depends only on its immediate past value.
This means that a structure in the series may prevail for
a random period of time, before being replaced by
another structure when a switching takes place. In this
way, the Markov regime-switching model is able to cap-
ture the more complex dynamic patterns (Hamilton,
1989, 2005), for example, the time-varying relationship of
funding liquidity and market liquidity. Moreover, we
focus our study in the U.S. corporate bond market
because it is the largest corporate bond market in the
world1 and the availability of the associated Trade
Reporting and Compliance Engine (TRACE) transaction-
level data. The TRACE data is the most comprehensive
and unique data source for an OTC corporate bond mar-
ket. Our sample covers all U.S. corporate bond transac-
tions in the secondary market in the period of 2004–2013,
hence it allows for a more accurate calculation of liquid-
ity measures (Dick-Nielsen, Feldhϋtter, & Lando, 2012).
Measuring liquidity is well-known to be a challenge
in literature, as liquidity consists of a few dimensions
including the breadth and depth of markets, transaction
cost, transaction speed and resiliency (price impact). If
the market is perfectly liquid, a trader can easily trade his
desired quantity, immediately, without moving the mar-
ket price. But if liquidity is less than perfect, the trader
must sacrifice one or more of these dimensions (see
Moulton, 2005). To tackle this issue, we follow Dick-
Nielsen et al. (2012) to construct a first principle
component market liquidity measure that combines the
dimensions of price impact and transaction costs. The
first principal component funding liquidity measure is
calculated in a similar manner based on the TED spread
and Libor-OIS spread.
We proceed in three steps. First, we construct a com-
posite market liquidity measure for U.S. corporate bonds
by using the first principal component of two market
liquidity measures—the Amihud (2002) price-impact
measure and the Roll (1984) measure of effective bid-ask
spreads. Each of the two measures is first calculated
using the TRACE transaction-level data on individual
bonds, and then aggregated across all individual bonds.
The composite funding liquidity measure for the
U.S. funding market is constructed in the similar manner
based on the first principal component of two funding
liquidity measures—Libor-OIS spread and TED spread.
Second, by controlling the aggregate bond market credit-
rating change,2 we investigate the drivers of the correla-
tion between funding liquidity and market liquidity
among the main macroeconomic variables, and use the
significant driving factor in the Markov regime-switching
model to predict and define regimes. Finally, we specify a
Markov regime-switching model to investigate the time-
varying relationship between funding liquidity and mar-
ket liquidity, where the two regimes are determined/
characterized by the bond market volatility (i.e., TYVIX)3
and money market liquidity (i.e., funding liquidity).
Our results show that funding liquidity and market
liquidity have a large-and-positive mutual effect when
money market is tight and bond market volatility is high,
but this mutual effect is much smaller or insignificant in
normal regimes. Specifically, the impact of FL on ML in
stressed regimes is greater than that in normal regimes,
by a factor of 2.7; and the impact of ML on FL is signifi-
cant in stressed regimes instead of normal regimes. The
mutually reinforcing impact of FL and ML in downside
markets is predicted in Brunnermeier and Peder-
sen (2009). Furthermore, FL is negatively related to ML
in normal regimes. We also find that the frequency of
being in a large-and-positive ML-to-FL impact state
(i.e., a stressed regime) is much less than that of being in
a large-and-positive FL-to-ML impact state (i.e., a stressed
regime). This reflects that funding liquidity (i.e., money
market liquidity) is more stable than bond market liquid-
ity with less regime changes.
Our study depicts the market mechanism in depth on
the time-varying relationship of funding liquidity and
market liquidity. In normal regimes, more information
(both public and private) is available in the market. If
informed traders access capital or loans more easily,
adverse selection can deter uninformed traders to trade,
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thus high funding liquidity can lower market liquidity,
though this negative effect on market liquidity is small.
However, when the market has had a negative shock,
market participants (including financiers who provide
capital or loans) encounter high uncertainty. They may
be inclined to interpret price volatility as fundamental
volatility, thus, raising capital and borrowing becomes
difficult and costly. In this circumstance, all traders are
reluctant to warehouse bonds and supply liquidity to the
market, and market illiquidity picks up. The 2008 finan-
cial crisis is a typical example: at that time banks stopped
lending to each other, and market liquidity suddenly
dried up.
There is a regime-dependent feedback effect of mar-
ket liquidity on funding liquidity too. The intuition is
straightforward. Traders tend not to carry excess capital
as it is expensive. While a market-wide fire sale is less
likely in normal regimes, this is common during down-
turns since traders have to de-leverage their positions by
selling part of their assets. The liquidation of a trader's
position can reduce other investors' net worth through
price effects. Therefore, declines in market liquidity may
further impair funding liquidity (see Dudley, 2016).
We add to the growing literature in two aspects. First,
the empirical literature has documented the relationship
of funding liquidity and market liquidity in linear frame-
works (see Boudt, Paulus, & Rosenthal, 2017; Chung,
Ahn, Baek, & Kang, 2017); in linear frameworks, choos-
ing the threshold value to classify regimes is a difficult
and usually subjective task. We complement the litera-
ture by using a Markov regime-switching model to inves-
tigate the dynamic relationship of funding liquidity and
market liquidity. The regime classification in this model
is probabilistic and is endogenously determined by a
Markov process. This approach is suitable to capture
complex dynamic patterns of the relationship between
FL and ML, which features with nonlinear stationarity
and structural breaks. Through this approach, we add
new findings to the literature (e.g., funding liquidity neg-
atively influences market liquidity in normal times but
this turns to be positive in stressed times). Second, this
article directly explores the dynamic interaction of FL
and ML in the U.S. corporate bond market, which is the
largest corporate bond market in the world that attracts
global investors.4
Our article relates to two strands of the literature.
First, recent theoretical developments arguing that mar-
ket liquidity is driven by funding liquidity. For instance,
Gromb and Vayanos (2002) propose that market liquidity
depends on the capital of financial intermediaries, that a
liquidation of arbitrageurs' positions does not only reduce
other arbitrageurs' net worth through price effects, but
also can be detrimental to other investors through a
reduction in market liquidity. Brunnermeier and Peder-
sen (2009) show that market and funding liquidities can
reinforce each other in different ways under different mar-
ket conditions. Second, our article is close to the empirical
works of Boudt et al. (2017) and Chung et al. (2017) in
which a linear framework is adopted in the analyses.
The former examines the effect of the bid-ask spread of
S&P 500 index on stock loan rates, and the later exam-
ines the relationship between liquidity discount rate
and the floating-rate bonds in the Japanese market.
Both works provide evidence that market liquidity and
funding liquidity are strongly and positively related
during market stress.
The remainder of the article is organized as follows.
Section 2 discusses the related literature and establishes
the hypothesis. Section 3 describes the data, the cleaning
of TRACE data, and the method to calculate the ML mea-
sure and FL measure. Section 4 investigates the driving
factors of the relationship of FL and ML. Section 5
explores the time-varying relationship of FL and ML in a
Markov regime-switching model, and Section 6 briefly
concludes the findings.
2 | LITERATURE REVIEW AND
HYPOTHESES
In his 2010 AFA presidential address, Duffie (2010) indi-
cates that financial crises and slow movement of invest-
ment capital increase the cost of intermediation, and thus
lead to increases in trading spreads. Moreover,
Duffie (2012) points out that the 2008 financial crisis not
only affected banks' lending function, but also had a
major impact on market liquidity. He further argues that
investors and issuers of securities would find it more
costly to borrow, raise capital, invest, hedge risks and
obtain liquidity for their existing positions during any
financial crisis.5
In the theoretical literature, the idea that rapid mar-
ket declines cause asset illiquidity has been developed in
various ways. For instance, the collateral-based models
argue that traders finance their trades by posting margins
and collateralizing the securities they hold. Thus, a nega-
tive shock in the market can hit traders' margin con-
straints, and force them to liquidate their assets. In this
category, Gromb and Vayanos (2002) propose that mar-
ket liquidity depends on the capital of financial interme-
diaries. When financial intermediaries are less well
capitalized, they cannot fully absorb other investors' sup-
ply shocks (thus providing market liquidity to them).
Gârleanu and Pedersen (2007) provide an explanation for
the fact that sudden drops in prices and liquidity are
related to higher volatility and lower risk-bearing
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capacity of institutions. Brunnermeier and Peder-
sen (2009) argue that a huge market-wide decline in
prices reduces the ease with which market makers can
obtain funding, which further restricts market makers
from providing market liquidity during these downturns.
Gârleanu and Pedersen (2011) show that a funding
liquidity crisis gives rise to a price gap between securities
with identical cash-flows but different margins.
In inventory models of market making, D'Souza and
Lai (2006) and Lescourret and Robert (2011) discuss how
funding capital may impact the behaviour of dealers and
thus market liquidity in the context of bank consolidation
or order preferencing. Other theoretical models also pre-
dict that large market declines cause agents to liquidate
their positions across many assets and reduce liquidity
supply, as liquidity providers hit their capital or funding
constraints (for a detailed review, see Hameed, Kang, &
Viswanathan, 2010).
While the theoretical literature has laid out the time-
varying connection between market liquidity and funding
liquidity (i.e., traders' funding constraints), the extant
empirical literature is limited and mainly investigate this
in a linear approach, focusing on stock and foreign
exchange (FX) markets. For example, Chordia, Sarkar,
and Subrahmanyam (2005) explore liquidity movements
in stock and Treasury bond markets over a period of more
than 1800 trading days, and establish a link between
mutual fund flows and transaction liquidity. Hameed
et al. (2010) find that negative market returns decrease
stock liquidity in 1988–2003, especially during times of
tightness in the funding market in that period. Their find-
ing is consistent with recent theoretical models where
binding capital constraints lead to sudden liquidity dry-
ups. Karolyi, Lee, and van Dijk (2012) find that common-
ality in stock market liquidity is greater in countries with
and during times of high market volatility (especially,
large market declines). However, there is little evidence
that commonality is greater in times of higher local inter-
est rates, which represent tighter credit conditions when
financial intermediaries are more likely to hit their capital
constraints. In the FX market, Mancini, Ranaldo, and
Wrampelmeyer (2013) show that negative shocks in
funding liquidity lead to significantly lower FX market
liquidity. Boudt et al. (2017) examine the effect of market
liquidity on equity-collateralized funding liquidity. They
document that market liquidity can affect funding liquid-
ity in a stabilizing (destabilizing) manner in a state charac-
terized by low (high) yield spread of Eurodollars over T-
bills. Chung et al. (2017) have documented similar find-
ings in the Japanese floating-rate bond market.
To contribute to the growing literature on funding
liquidity and market liquidity, we investigate the rela-
tionship of funding liquidity and market liquidity in the
U.S. corporate bond market in a non-linear Markov
regime-switching model. The hypothesis that we are test-
ing is as follows:
Hypothesis. Funding liquidity and market liquidity are
interlinked in the U.S. corporate bond market. The
relationship between them is time-varying and
depends on the market conditions, such as the tight-
ness of the money market and bond market
volatility.
3 | DATA AND LIQUIDITY
MEASURES
In this section, we first describe the TRACE data, money
market liquidity data and other macroeconomic data
used in the study, then we explain how we calculate cor-
porate bond market liquidity measures and funding
liquidity measures.
3.1 | Data
We compute market liquidity measures using corporate
bond transaction-level data from the U.S. TRACE
Enhanced database, which has the most comprehensive
coverage of the bond market in the United States.6 This
database was the result of regulatory initiatives more
than a decade ago to increase price transparency in the
U.S. corporate bond market. The Trace database was ini-
tially limited to selected investment-grade bonds during
its first phase, and it became comprehensive since
October 2004 when its final phase was fully implemented
and transactions of essentially all U.S. corporate bonds
were reported. The Enhanced Historic TRACE database
covers transactions up to September 2013 at the time of
our data collection, including those that qualify for del-
ayed dissemination.
Before usage, the data requires some cleaning. In par-
ticular, we remove transaction reports that are subse-
quently withdrawn or corrected as well as transactions
with spurious prices (above $1,000 or below $0.01). We
also search for transactions reported by both counter-
parties and delete one report for each of these pairs.
Across calendar years of the dataset, 2–3.5% of transac-
tion reports are dropped. These proportions are similar to
those reported by Dick-Nielsen (2009, 2014), who used
the same data filters. Table 1 presents the number of
transactions in our data before and after filtering.
We further exclude non-business dates from the
sample, following the Securities Industry and Financial
Markets Association (SIFMA) U.S. Holiday
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Recommendations. The following regression analyses
involve variables of bond market volatility (i.e., CBOE/
CBOT 10-Year U.S. Treasury Note Volatility Index—
TYVIX), aggregate credit-rating change (i.e., CDS
index—CDX), short-term interest rate (i.e., Federal
Fund Rate) and default spread of U.S. corporate bonds
(i.e., the difference between BAA and AAA-rated cor-
porate bond yields). We obtain the data from
Bloomberg and Datastream.
3.2 | Market liquidity measures
For the U.S. corporate bond market, we compute the fol-
lowing two measures of market liquidity using
transaction-level TRACE dataset for individual bonds.
All the metrics are computed at daily frequency, and
higher values indicate lower liquidity.
• Amihud measure: Amihud (2002) measures liquidity as
the ratio of the daily absolute return to the daily trading
volume. This measure proxies the price impact of trades.
Following Dick-Nielsen et al. (2012), we estimate the
price impact at the level of individual trades for each
bond, and take the average over the trade-level values
each day to obtain a measure at daily frequency for
that bond. The Amihud measure is defined as fol-
lows. For a given bond on a given day t, ri,t is the
return, Qi,t is the trade size (in $ million) of the ith
trade, and Nt is the number of trades. The Amihud
measure is then the daily average of the absolute









The aggregate Amihud measure on day t is the
median over individual bonds' Amihud measure on day
t. Bonds that have no Amihud measure on day t (due to
less than 2 transactions on day t) are excluded from the
median calculation on day t. A high level of the Amihud
measure implies a low liquidity.
• Roll measure: Roll (1984) shows that under certain
assumptions, the percentage bid-ask spread is equal to
two times the square root of the negative first-order
serial covariance of returns. The intuition is that the
transaction price will tend to bounce between the bid
and ask prices, so that returns on consecutive trades
are negatively correlated, and that this negative corre-
lation will be larger if the bid-ask spread is wider. For
a given bond on a given day t, ri,t is defined as the
return on the ith trade. Our implementation of the Roll
measure is then defined as:
Rollt =2
ffiffiffiffiffiffiffiffiffiffiffiffiffiffiffiffiffiffiffiffiffiffiffiffiffiffiffiffiffiffiffiffiffiffiffiffiffiffiffiffiffiffiffiffiffiffiffiffiffiffi
max 0,−cov ri,t,ri−1,tð Þf g:
p
Similar to the aggregate Amihud measure, the aggre-
gate Roll measure on day t is the median over individual
bonds' Roll measure on day t. Bonds that have no Roll
measure on day t (i.e., less than four transactions on day
t) are excluded from the median calculation on day t. A
high level of the Roll measure also implies a low
liquidity.
Figure 1a presents the Amihud measure and the Roll
measure over the sample period 2004–2013. Both mea-
sures show that liquidity deteriorated markedly during
the 2008 financial crisis, but it has recovered to around or
slightly below pre-crisis levels in the past few years.
Although the Amihud and Roll measures focus on
different dimensions of market liquidity, both measures
can be captured by a few latent factors. Following Dick-
Nielsen et al. (2012), we extract the first principal compo-
nent of the Amihud and Roll measures within a principal
component analysis, and combine them into a composite
measure. Both measures are standardized before their
principal component is extracted. We label this composite
TABLE 1 TRACE dataset before and after the error filtering
Year 2004 2005 2006 2007 2008
No. of original transactions 7,630,171 8,106,863 7,300,388 6,700,012 8,982,733
No. of transactions after filtering 7,356,939 7,847,110 7,070,415 6,514,108 8,758,683
Removed transactions (%) 3.6 3.2 3.2 2.8 2.5
Year 2009 2010 2011 2012 2013
No. of original transactions 15,509,598 16,196,361 14,865,946 16,353,092 12,535,053
No. of transactions after filtering 15,151,480 15,760,565 14,558,377 15,849,214 12,153,785
Removed transactions (%) 2.3 2.7 2.1 3.1 3
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market liquidity measure as Market Liquidity measure
(ML). A high level of ML implies a low market liquidity.
We will use this definition of market liquidity in the rest
of the article.
3.3 | Funding liquidity measures
We use the following funding liquidity measures:
• TED spread: TED spread is the difference between the
3-month USD Libor7 and the 3-month U.S. Treasury
bill rate. In times of uncertainty, banks charge higher
interest for unsecured loans, which increases the
LIBOR rate. Further, banks want to get first-rate collat-
eral, which makes Treasury bonds more attractive and
pushes down the Treasury bond rate. For both reasons,
the TED spread widens in times of crises. Hence, TED
spread is widely used as a measure of tightness in the
interbank market (see Gârleanu & Pedersen, 2007;
Nyborg & Östberg, 2014). We obtain the data from the
Federal Reserve Bank in St. Louis.
• Libor-OIS spread: Libor-OIS spread is the difference
between 3-month USD Libor and the 3-month USD
overnight index swap rate. Libor-OIS spread also
reflects tightness in the interbank market. Compared
to TED spread, Libor-OIS spread may be a more pre-
cise measure of the state of the interbank market, since
it is the difference between two interbank rates, rather
than an interbank and a treasury rate (see Nyborg &
Östberg, 2014).
Figure 1b shows the TED spread and Libor-OIS
spread over the sample period. Both funding liquidity
measures feature a sharp pick-up during the 2007–2008
crisis period, but they remained low and stable in pre-
and post-crisis periods.
Following the same method as the construction of the
composite market liquidity measure, we derive the com-
posite funding liquidity measure using the first principal
FIGURE 1 The market liquidity and funding liquidity measures. This figure illustrates the U.S. corporate bond market liquidity
measures and funding liquidity measures from 1 January 2004 to 30 September 2013. (a) Plots the daily corporate bond market liquidity of
Amihud and Roll measure. The Amihud measure is aggregated by the median across the daily mean value of individual bond's Amihud
measure. The Roll measure is aggregated by the median across the individual bond's daily Roll measure. (b) Illustrates the United States
daily funding liquidity measures of TED spread and Libor-OIS spread. (c) Shows the daily composite market liquidity measure (ML) and the
daily composite funding liquidity measure (FL) and (d) shows the changes in ML (ΔML) and the changes in FL (ΔFL) on a 22-day moving
average [Colour figure can be viewed at wileyonlinelibrary.com]
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component of the Libor-OIS spread and TED spread. We
label this composite funding liquidity measure as
Funding Liquidity measure (FL). Similarly to the com-
posite market liquidity measure (ML), a high level of FL
implies a low funding liquidity. We will use this defini-
tion of funding liquidity in the rest of the article.
Figure 1c shows the daily composite funding liquidity
measure (FL) and the composite market liquidity mea-
sure (ML) over the sample period. While both FL and ML
became very volatile with sharp rises (i.e., more illiquid)
during the 2007–2008 crisis period, they tended to move
opposite way in the pre- and post-crisis period. In the
pre-crisis period, ML exhibited a downward trend
(i.e., more liquid), whereas FL showed a slightly upward
trend though mainly remained stable. In the post-crisis
period, FL returned to pre-crisis level much more quickly
than ML. This provides the first evidence to the Hypothe-
sis. Figure 1c also shows that FL is less volatile than ML
over the sample period, implying that funding liquidity
(i.e., money market liquidity) could be more stable than
corporate bond market liquidity. This will be elaborated
in the following Markov regime-switching analysis,
where funding liquidity has less regime changes than
market liquidity. Figure 1d further displays the change in
ML (ΔML) and FL (ΔFL) on a 22-day moving average
(i.e., equivalent to a monthly average), which will be used
in the following Markov regime modelling.8
Visually, while FL spikes up during the 2007–2008
financial crisis period but maintains a low level in the
pre- and post-crisis periods, ML has a tendency of decline
over the sample period, though it also spikes up during
the crisis period. The decline of ML in the post-crisis
period relative to the pre-crisis period may be due to the
U.S. Quantitative Easing (QE) programme implemented
from 1 December 2008, in which the U.S. Fed increased
money supply by purchasing mortgage- and treasury-
backed bonds. It has been documented in the literature
that QE can improve market liquidity (see, e.g.,
Christensen & Gillan, 2018). We therefore include QE as
a control variable in the following Markov regime-
switching analysis on the relationship of funding liquid-
ity and market liquidity.




Since funding liquidity and market liquidity are hypothe-
sized to correlate with each other regardless of market
conditions, a natural question to ask is what drives this
correlation. In this section, we try to answer this question
by considering some main macroeconomic variables. The
findings can help to specify the subsequent Markov
regime-switching model, in which different regimes of
the relationship can be predicted/characterized by these
determinants.
The macroeconomic variables include bond market
volatility index (TYVIX), changes in default spread
TABLE 3 Correlation matrix ML FL ΔML ΔFL ΔCDX TYVIX ΔDEF
FL .57
ΔML .23 .31
ΔFL .00 .35 .41
ΔCDX .07 .24 .38 .19
TYVIX .76 .60 .17 .01 .22
ΔDEF .06 .19 .21 .21 .22 .06
ΔFed −.04 −.09 −.07 −.06 −.03 −.05 .00
Note: This table presents the correlation coefficients of the variables defined in Table 2.
TABLE 2 Summary statistics
Mean SD Min Max
ML 0.000 1.398 −2.207 6.052
FL −0.002 1.368 −1.033 10.735
ΔML −0.001 0.028 −0.107 0.238
ΔFL 0.001 0.042 −0.273 0.400
ΔCDX 0.013 0.811 −3.773 4.499
TYVIX 6.756 2.102 3.620 14.720
ΔDEF 0.000 0.024 −0.170 0.350
ΔFed 0.000 0.082 −0.880 1.010
Note: This table presents the summary statistics of the variables. ML is the
composite bond market liquidity and FL is the composite funding liquidity
that are defined in Sections 3.1 and 3.2. ΔML, ΔFL and ΔCDX are the 22-day
moving averages of the ML, FL and credit default swap spread (CDX),
respectively. TYVIX is the United States Treasury note volatility index. ΔDEF
and ΔFed are the daily changes of the default spread (i.e., the difference
between the United States BAA and AAA-rated corporate bond yields) and
Federal Fund Rate, respectively.
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(ΔDEF) and changes in the Federal Fund Rate (ΔFed). In
addition, Bond market liquidity is closely related with its
credit quality. Studies on bond market liquidity normally
control for the credit quality by categorizing bonds into
groups of different credit ratings (see, e.g., Bao, Pan, &
Wang, 2011; Chen, Lesmond, & Wei, 2007; Díaz &
Escribano, 2019; Dick-Nielsen et al., 2012; Helwege,
Huang, & Wang, 2014).9 Since Hull, Predescu, and
White (2004) indicate that credit default swap (CDS)
spreads track credit-rating changes, we use CDS spreads
to control for the market-wide credit rating changes. Spe-
cifically, we employ the Barclays CDX index10 in the
United States market as a control variable.
Tables 2 and 3 present the summary statistics and corre-
lation matrix of the variables. As expected, market liquidity
and funding liquidity are highly correlated, either as
changes (i.e., ΔML and ΔFL) or as levels (i.e.,ML and FL).
We regress the correlation coefficient of FL and ML
on the above mentioned macroeconomic variables and a
dummy variable that indicates the presence or absence of
the implementation of the U.S. quantitative easing pro-
gramme (QE). Equation (1) presents the regression model
and the estimates. The SDs are in the parenthesis.
Corrt = −0:03+ 0:003TYVIXt +0:11ΔDEFt−0:04ΔFedt
+0:004QEt +0:003ΔCDXt + γXt −3:56ð Þ 2:88ð Þ 1:16ð Þ
−1:35ð Þ 0:83ð Þ 1:12ð Þ
Adj:R2 = 0:93 ð1Þ
where Corrt is the correlation coefficient of ML and FL
calculated at a 22-day moving average window, t is the
trading day, TYVIXt is the bond market volatility index,
ΔDEFt is the change in default spread (i.e., the difference
between BAA and AAA-rated corporate bond yields),
ΔFedt is the change in Federal Fund Rate, QEt is the
dummy variable with value of 0 if trading date is in the
period of 5 January 2004 to 30 November 2008 or 1 other-
wise (i.e., from 1 December 2008 to 30 September 2013),
ΔCDXt is the change in CDX spreads, Xt consists of two
lags of the dependent variable to control potential resid-
ual autocorrelation.
The regression results show that bond market volatil-
ity index (TYVIX) is the only significant driving factor of
the correlation coefficient of FL and ML, where an
increase in bond market volatility will increase the corre-
lation of funding liquidity and market liquidity. Since
TYVIX is usually regarded as an indicator of market
stress, our result implies that the level of market stress
determines the strength of the correlation between
funding liquidity and market liquidity. Our result is also
consistent with Fleming, Kirby, and Ostdiek (1998), in
which the authors find a strong volatility linkage
between the stock, bond and money markets, especially
after the 1987 stock market crash. In the following sec-
tions, we will elaborate this implication in a Markov
regime-switching model, where bond market volatility
serves as a regime predictor.
Before we investigate the non-linear relationship
between FL and ML, we first estimate the linear relation-
ship between them, where the results are presented in
Table A1. The results confirm that FL and corporate
bond ML are significantly interlinked. To further explore
the regime-dependent relationship of FL and ML, we
employ the Markov regime-switching approach.
5 | THE TIME-VARYING
RELATIONSHIP OF FUNDING
LIQUIDITY AND MARKET
LIQUIDITY: A MARKOV REGIME-
SWITCHING APPROACH
Although funding liquidity and market liquidity are often
treated as distinct, they can be closely related, espe-
cially during a financial crisis (see Dudley, 2016). Spe-
cifically, market liquidity is strongly affected by
funding liquidity in a state of deteriorating market con-
ditions (e.g., when the money market becomes illiquid
and the bond market volatility increases), while this
impact is much smaller in a normal state. Dudley (2016)
provides some intuitive explanation of market liquidity
as a function of funding liquidity. Since funding liquid-
ity is the ability of a financial entity to borrow, it can
be regarded as the shadow cost of capital. If funding
liquidity declines because of market stress, this may
cause intermediaries to become less willing to provide
market liquidity (see Dudley, 2016).
The Hypothesis calls for two important features of the
empirical model: regime-dependent relationship of funding
liquidity and market liquidity, and the use of market stress
indicators, that is, funding liquidity and bond market vola-
tility index to classify stressed and normal regimes. We fol-
low Watanabe and Watanabe (2008) to use a Markov
regime-switching model to accommodate these features in
our empirical investigation. Section 5.1 lays out the analysis
for the impact of FL on ML, and Section 5.2 lays out the
analysis for the impact of ML on FL.
5.1 | The impact of funding liquidity on
market liquidity
In this section, we investigate the impact of FL on ML. We
specify the Markov regime-switching model as follows11:
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ΔMLt = αSt + βStΔFLt + δQEt + γΔCDXt + εSt ,t, ð2Þ





where ΔMLt, ΔFLt, ΔCDXt and QEt are defined in the
previous section, s = 1, 2 represents the states. We
assume that the state transition for Equation (2) is
governed by a Markov switching probability:
Pr st = sjst−1;Predictort−1ð Þ
=
exp cst + dst Predictort−1ð Þ
1+ exp cst + dst Predictort−1ð Þ
,s=1,2,
ð3Þ
where Predictort − 1 is TYVIXt − 1 and FLt − 1, respectively,
cst and dst are scalars. Predictor is used as a state variable
to help predict and classify the FL–ML relationship states.
The exponential transformation ensures that the transition
probability always falls between 0 and 1. Following
Watanabe and Watanabe (2008), we define that day t is in
State 2 if the associated estimated probability of being in
State 2 is higher than 0.75, and that day t is in State 1 other-
wise. To avoid the daily time series being too volatile to
define market regimes, we use ΔFL and ΔML in Equa-
tions (2) and (3) in a 22-day moving average (i.e., equivalent
to a monthly average). Estimating Equations (2) and (3)
gives a way of examining how market liquidity is affected
by funding liquidity in the two different states.
Let us first look at the results on how funding liquid-
ity affects market liquidity, that is, the estimates for
Equations (2) and (3) where ΔML is the dependent vari-
able. Panel A in Table 4 presents the estimated parame-
ters of the Markov regime-switching model where the
state indicator is TYVIX. Out of 2,299 days from January
2004 to September 2013, there were 764 days in the
stressed State 2, characterized by high funding illiquidity
(the mean of FL in State 2 is greater than in State 1), high
market illiquidity (the mean of ML in State 2 is greater
than in State 1), high bond market volatility (the mean of
TYVIX in State 2 is greater than in State 1, σ2 > σ1), and
high credit risk (i.e., high risk of credit-rating downgrade;
the mean of CDX in State 2 is greater than in State 1).
We observe a negative impact of FL on ML in normal
times (State 1) and a much stronger positive impact of FL
on ML in stressed times (State 2). Both estimated impact
coefficients are statistically significant. The likelihood
ratio test (LR test) strongly rejects the null hypotheses
that β1 = β2 and σ1 = σ2.
Most importantly, the magnitude of β2 exceeds that of
β1, by a factor of 2.7 (i.e., 0.332/j−0.124j = 2.7), implying
that FL affects ML more strongly in stressed regimes than
in normal regimes. This supports the Hypothesis that the
impact of funding liquidity on market liquidity is highly
regime-dependent. While FL has a small impact on ML
when the bond market volatility is low, it has a large
impact when bond market volatility is high.
Furthermore, bond market volatility significantly
predicts the two FL-to-ML impact state: large-and-
positive impact state and the small-and-negative impact
state. The significant d1 coefficient (−0.403) of TYVIX
implies that high bond market volatility tends to reduce
the probability of staying in the small-and-negative FL-
to-ML impact state and consequently moves to the
large-and-positive FL-to-ML impact state. The LR test
strongly rejects the null hypothesis that d1 = d2 = 0
with p-value of zero. This finding supports our
Hypothesis.
Panel A in Figure 2 plots the estimated probability of
being in the stressed State 2 (i.e., the large-and-positive
FL-to-ML impact state), in which the bond market vola-
tility index (TYVIX) is the state indicator. It is visually
clear that the high probability of being in State 2 clusters
in the 2007–2008 crisis period, and around 2010–2011
period coinciding with the Euro-debt crisis. This is con-
sistent with the Hypothesis, that a tightened funding
market deteriorates market liquidity when the market is
in stress. Furthermore, the high probability of being in
State 2 is visually less frequent in the post-crisis period
relative to the pre-crisis period. This is associated with
the significant coefficient of QE (−0.003). That said, the
post-crisis United States QE program has improved mar-
ket liquidity, and market liquidity is higher in the post-
crisis period than the pre-crisis period when no QE was
implemented. It is worth noting that the coefficient of
ΔCDX is significantly positive, implying that an increase
in credit risk (i.e., probability of credit-rating downgrade)
dampens bond market liquidity.
Alternatively, we use funding liquidity (FL) as an
indicator of market stress to predict the FL-to-ML impact
states. Panel B in Table 4 presents the estimated parame-
ters of the Markov regime-switching model, where the
state indicator is FL, and Panel B in Figure 2 plots the
associated estimated probability of being in State 2. Out
of 2,299 days from January 2004 to September 2013, there
were 784 days in the stressed State 2. Not surprisingly,
the days in the stressed State 2 predicted by FL largely
overlap with those predicted by TYVIX, that is, an overlap
of 754 days in State 2. As a consequence, the characteris-
tics of State 2 indicated by FL are the same as those by
TYVIX, that is, high funding illiquidity (the mean of FL
in State 2 is greater than in State 1), high corporate bond
market illiquidity (the mean ofML in State 2 is greater than
in State 1), high bond market volatility (the mean of TYVIX
in State 2 is greater than in State 1, σ2 > σ1), and high credit
risk (the mean of CDX in State 2 is greater than in State 1).
The overall estimates are quantitatively similar to those
where TYVIX is used as the state predictor.
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The regime-switching of FL-to-ML impact between
stressed and normal regimes may depict an interesting
market mechanism. In normal regimes, there is usually
more information (both public and private) available for
evaluating securities. Hence the range of investors' expec-
tation on fair prices is narrow. And this is reflected by a
low-price volatility. In normal times, funding markets are
generally liquid. For example, in our case, the mean of
FL is −0.28 in the normal State 1 relative to 0.55 in the
stressed State 2. If some traders have information advan-
tage, and if they can access capital or loans easily when
funding liquidity is high, then adverse selection can deter
uninformed traders to trade, thus lowering market liquid-
ity. However, in stressed regimes when the market has
suffered a negative shock with high uncertainty, there is
less information available. All traders, as well as finan-
ciers who provide them with capital or loans, are rela-
tively uninformed about fundamentals. They are inclined
to interpret price volatility as fundamental volatility,
hence raising capital and borrowing becomes difficult
and costly. In this circumstance, all traders are reluctant
to warehouse bonds and supply liquidity to the market,
that is, market liquidity gets much worse.
The 2008 financial crisis provides a typical example
for this large-and-positive impact of FL on ML due to
insufficient information. During the crisis, the lack of
information about the true financial position of bor-
rowers made banks reluctant to lend to each other (see,
e.g., Calomiris, 2009). The fact that interlinkages between
banks are so complex further deteriorated the transpar-
ency and sufficiency of information, and banks have to
worry not only about the counterparty risk of their neigh-
bours, but also of their neighbours' neighbours (see
Caballero & Simsek, 2013).
It is worth noting that our estimate of the negative
impact of FL on ML in normal regimes differ from
Chung et al. (2017) and Moinas, Nguyen, and
Valente (2018), where the authors find that a worsen
funding liquidity either has no significant impact on
the market, or if it does impact, that impact is positive.
TABLE 4 Estimates of the Markov regime-switching model on the FL-to-ML impact
Parameters Common parameters Parameters Common parameters
Panel A Panel B
State predictor: TYVIX State predictor: Funding liquidity (FL)
α1 .001 c1 6.406 α1 .001 c1 3.632
α2 −.003 c2 3.279 α2 −.003 c2 3.381
β1 −.124 d1 −0.403 β1 −.124 d1 −0.954
β2 .332 d2 0.009 β2 .334 d2 −0.119
σ1 0.015 QE −0.003 σ1 0.015 QE −0.003
σ2 0.031 ΔCDX 0.011 σ2 0.030 ΔCDX 0.011
LR tests Common LR tests LR tests Common LR tests
β1 = β2 112 d1 = d2 = 0 15 β1 = β2 112 d1 = d2 = 0 19
σ1 = σ2 401 σ1 = σ2 402
Max LK (per period) 5,588 (2.41) Max LK (per period) 5,590 (2.41)
Daily means of selected variables by states Daily means of selected variables by states
All State 1 State 2 All State 1 State 2
ML −0.01 −0.42 0.81 ML −0.01 −0.42 0.78
FL 0.01 −0.26 0.54 FL 0.01 −0.28 0.55
TYVIX 6.74 6.31 7.59 TYVIX 6.74 6.33 7.54
CDX 88.71 85.86 94.43 CDX 88.71 86.16 93.64
No. days 2,299 1,535 764 No. days 2,299 1,515 784
Sample period (No. obs) 200,401:201309 (2322)
Note: This table presents the estimates of the impact of funding liquidity (FL) to market liquidity (ML) using Equations (2) and (3). Panels A and B report the
results in which the regime predictor is bond market volatility (TYVIX) and funding liquidity (FL), respectively. The variables are defined in Table 2. The
sample period is from 5 January 2004 to 30 September 2013. The table also shows χ2 statistics for the likelihood ratio tests (LR Tests) on various parameter
restrictions, and the maximized log likelihood (Max LK) of the model estimation. The estimates and test statistics in bold refer to an, at least, 5% significance
level.
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This might be attributed to the high frequency data we
use in the study that capture the fast-changing feature
of liquidity. Chordia, Roll, and Subrahmanyam (2001)
finds that daily changes in market averages of liquidity
are highly volatile, and liquidity plummets signifi-
cantly in down markets.
5.2 | The impact of market liquidity on
funding liquidity
The time-varying feedback effect from ML to FL is
another concern, which is explored in this section. We
specify the Markov regime-switching model as follows12:
FIGURE 2 The estimated probability of being in State 2 on the FL-to-ML impact. This figure shows the probability of being in State
2 estimated by Equations (2) and (3), where Panels A and B are for the state predictors of bond market volatility (TYVIX) and funding
liquidity (FL), respectively [Colour figure can be viewed at wileyonlinelibrary.com]
CHEN ET AL. 11
ΔFLt = αSt + βStΔMLt + δQEt + γΔCDXt + εSt ,t, ð4Þ
where s = 1, 2 represents the states, ΔMLt, ΔFLt,
ΔCDXt and QEt are defined in the previous section,





Similar to the previous section, we assume that the
state transition for Equation (4) is governed by a Markov
switching probability:
Pr st = sjst−1;Predictort−1ð Þ
=
exp cst + dst Predictort−1ð Þ
1+ exp cst + dst Predictort−1ð Þ
,s=1,2,
ð5Þ
where Equation (5) is defined the same as Equation (3).
Panel A in Table 5 shows the estimated parameters
where the state is predicted by bond market volatility index
TYVIX. Out of 2,299 days from January 2004 to September
2013, 440 days were in the stressed State 2, characterized by
high funding illiquidity (the mean of FL in State 2 is greater
than in State 1), high market illiquidity (the mean of ML in
State 2 is greater than in State 1), high bond market volatil-
ity (the mean of TYVIX in State 2 is greater than in State
1, σ2 > σ1) and high credit risk (the mean of CDX in State
2 is greater than in State 1). We observe a significantly posi-
tive impact of ML on FL in state 2 (i.e., stressed regimes),
whereas this is insignificant in state 1 (normal regimes).
Usually, traders tend not to carry excess capital as it is
expensive. During downturns in particular, traders have
to de-leverage their positions by selling part of their
assets. The liquidation of a trader's position can reduce
other investors' net worth through price effects. Thus,
declines in market liquidity may further impair funding
liquidity (see Dudley, 2016). Our finding supports the
Hypothesis that the feedback effect of market liquidity on
funding liquidity is highly regime-dependent, where a
much stronger feedback effect occurs when bond market
is volatile and money market is tight.
TYVIX significantly predicts the regime-switching of
ML-to-FL. The coefficient of d1 is −0.352 and is
statistically significant, implying that high bond market
volatility tends to reduce the probability of being in the
TABLE 5 Estimates of the Markov regime-switching model on the ML-to-FL impact
Parameters Common parameters Parameters Common parameters
Panel A Panel B
State predictor: TYVIX State predictor: Funding liquidity (FL)
α1 .002 c1 7.087 α1 .002 c1 4.560
α2 −.001 c2 1.880 α2 −.001 c2 2.853
β1 .005 d1 −0.352 β1 .006 d1 −1.112
β2 1.210 d2 0.175 β2 1.215 d2 0.489
σ1 0.007 QE −0.002 σ1 0.007 QE −0.002
σ2 0.073 ΔCDX 0.005 σ2 0.074 ΔCDX 0.005
LR tests Common LR tests LR tests Common LR tests
β1 = β2 183 d1 = d2 = 0 9 β1 = β2 182 d1 = d2 = 0 25
σ1 = σ2 4,186 σ1 = σ2 1931
Max LK (per period) 7,029 (3.03) Max LK (per period) 7,037 (3.03)
Daily means of selected variables by states Daily means of selected variables by states
All State 1 State 2 All State 1 State 2
ML −0.01 −0.29 1.16 ML −0.01 −0.28 1.16
FL 0.01 −0.40 1.73 FL 0.01 −0.41 1.79
TYVIX 6.74 6.21 8.96 TYVIX 6.74 6.22 8.99
CDX 88.71 80.21 124.63 CDX 88.71 80.28 125.36
No. days 2,299 1859 440 No. days 2,299 1869 430
Sample period (No. obs) 200,401:201309 (2322)
Note: This table presents the estimates on the impact of market liquidity (ML) to funding liquidity (FL) using Equations (4) and (5). Panels A and B report the
results in which the regime predictor is the bond market volatility index (TYVIX) and funding liquidity (FL), respectively. The variables are defined in Table 2.
The sample period is from 5 January 2004 to 30 September 2013. The table also shows χ2 statistics for the likelihood ratio tests (LR Tests) on various parameter
restrictions, and the maximized log likelihood (Max LK) of the model estimation. The estimates and test statistics in bold refer to an, at least, 5% significance
level.
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small-and-positive impact state of ML-to-FL, and conse-
quently moves to the large-and-positive impact state of
ML-to-FL. Meanwhile, the coefficient of d2 is positive
and insignificant, implying that high bond market
volatility tends to increase the probability of staying in
the large-and-positive impact state of ML-to-FL, though
this is less significant. The LR test strongly rejects the
null hypothesis that d1 = d2 = 0 with p-value of zero.
FIGURE 3 The estimated probability of being in State 2 on the ML-to-FL impact. This figure shows the probability of being in State
2 estimated by Equations (4) and (5), where Panels A and B are for the state predictors of bond market volatility (TYVIX) and funding
liquidity (FL), respectively [Colour figure can be viewed at wileyonlinelibrary.com]
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This finding supports the Hypothesis that bond market
volatility is a critical condition of regime changes in the
relationship of market liquidity and funding liquidity.
Panel A in Figure 3 plots the estimated probability of
being in the large-and-positive ML-to-FL impact state
(i.e., stressed regime), in which the bond market volatility
index TYVIX is the state predictor. Similarly to the large-
and-positive FL-to-ML impact state (i.e., stressed regime),
a high probability of being in the large-and-positive ML-
to-FL impact state clusters in the 2007–2008 crisis period
and the 2010–2011 Euro-debt crisis period. However,
high probabilities of being in the large-and-positive ML-
to-FL impact state (i.e., stressed regimes in Figure 3) are
predicted much less frequently than that for the large-
and-positive FL-to-ML impact state (i.e., stressed regimes
in Figure 2). This is true even during the post-2008 crisis
period, when funding liquidity has been improved thanks
to the U.S. QE program (i.e., the estimated coefficient of
the regime-independent variable QE is −0.002 and signif-
icant). This indicates that money market liquidity
(i.e., funding liquidity) is more stable than bond market
liquidity with less regime changes. We also note that the
coefficient of ΔCDX to ΔFL is significantly positive
(0.005), and is smaller than the coefficient of ΔCDX to
ΔML (0.011) as shown in Table 4. This implies that the
influence of credit risk (i.e., credit-rating changes) is
more associated with bond market liquidity rather than
funding liquidity.
Panel B in Table 5 presents the estimated parameters
of the Markov regime-switching model where the state
predictor is funding liquidity, and Panel B in Figure 3
plots the associated estimated probability of being in
State 2. The overall estimates are quantitatively and qual-
itatively similar to those where the TYVIX is used as the
state predictor.
6 | CONCLUSIONS AND
IMPLICATIONS
Inspired by the recent debates and theoretical develop-
ment on funding liquidity and market liquidity, we inves-
tigate the time-varying relationship of funding liquidity
and market liquidity. By using a Markov regime-
switching model to capture the complex dynamic pat-
terns of financial time series, and the U.S. TRACE
transaction-level data for corporate bonds from 2004 to
2013, we find that funding liquidity and corporate bond
market liquidity are interlinked, and their impact on
each other is highly regime-dependent, even controlling
for the bond market credit-rating change. The impact of
FL on ML in stressed regimes is greater than that in nor-
mal regimes, by a factor of 2.7. We further find that the
influence of FL changes signs between the two regimes:
while FL has a positive impact on ML in stressed
regimes, it has a negative impact on ML in normal
regimes. This may reflect the adverse selection effect cau-
sed by informed traders in normal regimes.
The feedback effect of market liquidity on funding
liquidity is highly regime-dependent too. A worsened ML
reduces FL in stressed regimes, yet has no significant
impact in normal regimes. The regime-switching is driven
by the tightness of the money market and the bond market
volatility. Furthermore, funding liquidity is more stable
than bond market liquidity with less regime changes.
Our article offers interesting findings to market par-
ticipants, since markets are more tightly inter-
connected in recent decades and liquidity factors play
an increasingly important role in asset pricing
(O'Hara, 2015). Our article offers useful policy implica-
tion too. Central bank monetary policy operations typi-
cally focus on the funding market. For instance, on
12 December 2007, the Bank of Canada, the Bank of
England, the European Central Bank (ECB), the Fed-
eral Reserve and the Swiss National Bank jointly
announced a set of measures designed to address ele-
vated pressures in the funding markets, and to assess
the effect of the establishment of these central bank
liquidity facilities on the corporate bond market liquid-
ity. Our article provides evidence that funding liquidity
affects market liquidity in different magnitude and
direction between stressed and normal regimes, and
market liquidity affects funding liquidity in different
magnitude but in the same direction between stressed
and normal regimes. Thus, we offer further insight on
the important mechanism by which central banks can
improve market liquidity through the funding market.
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1 The U.S. corporate bond market has $8.5 trillion issues outstand-
ing in 2016 (SIFMA Research, 2017).
2 This is proxied by the change in the Barclays credit default swap
spreads index in the US market.
3 This is proxied by the CBOE/CBOT 10-Year U.S. Treasury Note
Volatility Index.
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4 Macchiavelli and Zhou (2019) and Rapp (2018) investigate the
impact of dealers' funding constraints on their liquidity provision
in the U.S. corporate bond market. Differ to their studies, our
article focuses on how the market-wide funding liquidity
(i.e., money market liquidity), as a general financial market con-
dition, is related to the U.S. corporate bond market liquidity.
5 There are a number of studies review the role of liquidity in the
2007–2008 financial crisis. See, for example, Brunnermeier (2009),
Chiu, Chung, Ho, and Wang (2012), Dick-Nielsen et al. (2012)
and Rösch and Kaserer (2013).
6 The finalization of the TRACE system has been through several
stages. At the beginning stage, only trades of all investment-
grade issues and a limited amount of high yield bonds were
required to be reported. More high yield bonds were included in
the system in the later stage and by 2004, 99% of all trades were
disseminated.
7 USD Libor is the average interbank interest rate at which a large
number of banks on the London money market are prepared to
lend one another unsecured funds denominated in US Dollars.
8 Both ΔML and ΔFL are stationary in the Dickey–Fuller test unit
root test, making the use of the time series fits in the assumption
of Markov regime-switching model.
9 We are very grateful to the reviewer for the suggestion of includ-
ing credit rating of bonds as a control factor in our model.
10 The data is from Bloomberg Barclays CDX.NA.IG.
11 The Wald test on the linear regression of Equation (2) without
QE shows a significant structure break of the estimated coeffi-
cients on 7 August 2007, coinciding with the 2007 subprime
mortgage market crisis.
12 The Wald test on the linear regression of Equation (4) without
QE shows a significant structure break of the estimated coeffi-
cients on 16 October 2008, coinciding with the 2008 financial
market meltdown.
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APPENDIX A.
TABLE A1 Estimates of the linear
regressions on the FL-to-ML impact and
ML-to-FL impact Independent variable
FL-to-ML impact ML-to-FL impact
ΔML Coefficients ΔFL Coefficients
ΔFL 0.239 ΔML 0.581
ΔCDX 0.011 ΔCDX 0.001
QE −0.001 QE −0.008
Constant −0.001 Constant 0.006
Adj_R2 0.27 Adj_R2 0.18
Note: This table presents the estimates of a linear regression version of Equations (2) and (3). The variables
are defined in Table 2. The estimates in bold refer to an, at least, 5% significance level.
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